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SITUATION-SPECIFIC FIDUCIARY DUTIES FOR
CORPORATE DIRECTORS: ENFORCEABLE
OBLIGATIONS OR TOOTHLESS IDEALS?*
I. INTRODUCTION
A process of philosophical change is underway in the corporate world.,
Judicial opinions, legislative acts, and scholarly legal articles are replete
with evidence of dissatisfaction with the traditional idea that a corporation
is a mere profit-making entity whose interests are equivalent to the interests
of those who hold its stock.2 Helping to replace the notion that the singular
role of the corporation in our society is to maximize shareholder wealth is
a realistic understanding that the modern corporation is a tremendously
influential institution. 3 The emerging idea is that today's corporate direc-
tors-whose decisions have far-reaching effects on many more groups than
just the corporation's shareholders-should consider the interests of the
* The author would like to thank Professors Lyman P.Q. Johnson and David K.
Millon for their valuable comments and insights.
1. See Uawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing
Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEx. L. Rav. 579, 582-83 (1992) (noting broad questioning
of paradigms underlying traditional corporate law); Marketplace: Leadership in the 1990s
[hereinafter Marketplace] (American Public Radio broadcast, Sept. 7, 1992) (reporting on
"paradigm shift" in corporate world); see also Lyman Johnson, Individual and Collective
Sovereignty in the Corporate Enterprise, 92 COLUM. L. RFv. 2214, 2245 (1992) [hereinafter
Johnson, Sovereignty] (reviewing FRANc H. EASTERBROOK & DMIEL R. FSCiHEL, THE EcoNoNeC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991) and ROBERT N. BELLAH, THE GOOD SOCIETY (1991)
and predicting that 1990s will be "critical transitional period in corporate law and scholarship");
Lyman Johnson, The Delaware Judiciary and the Meaning of Corporate Life and Corporate
Law, 68 TEx. L. RE,. 865, 867 (1990) [hereinafter Johnson, Meaning of Corporate Life]
(asserting that hostile takeover climate of late 1980s forced reconsideration of reason for
corporate existence).
2. See David Millon, State Takeover Laws: A Rebirth of Corporation Law?, 45 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 903, 905 (1988) (noting that takeover laws reject strictly shareholder-centered
corporate thinking and represent deep questioning of basic premises of corporation law);
Mitchell, supra note 1, at 584 (observing profound effect modern corporations' actions have
on variety of groups in society); Marketplace, supra note I (reporting widespread adherence
among business and legal professionals to idea that corporations are comprised of variety of
stakeholders, not just stockholders); infra notes 34-76 and accompanying text (describing
traditional model of corporate governance); infra notes 13-25, 89-108 and accompanying text
(describing Delaware judiciary's trend away from corporate model embodying absolute share-
holder primacy); infra note 9 (listing 28 state statutes that attempt to alter corporate dynamics).
3. See ROaBRT N. BELIA Er AL., Tan GOOD SOcIETY 11 (1991) (maintaining that
corporation's rights, duties, powers and responsibilities make it central institution and major
force in America); Mitchell, supra note 1, at 584 n.18 (offering as example of corporations'
societal influence, pinch that public felt when American oil companies raised gasoline prices
in response to Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait).
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other groups whose fate they influence. 4 Board consideration of nonshare-
holder groups holding a stake in the corporation is especially imperative in
situations in which the interests of one or more of these "stakeholder"
groups are implicated to a greater degree than are shareholder interests.,
The traditional model's requirement that the board of a solvent cor-
poration all but ignore the interests of everyone except the shareholders-
no matter what the circumstances-has yielded inequities. 6 As the legal
community has become increasingly aware of these inequities, it has begun
to formulate alternative theories regarding the purpose of the public cor-
poration in a free society. 7 In rethinking the question of corporate purpose,
the law has recognized the need for director attention to the interests of
corporate stakeholders other than shareholders and has attempted to accom-
modate this need.'
4. See David Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, 24 IND. L. REv. 223, 225 (1991)
(stating that "number of nonshareholder constituencies depend upon the corporation for their
welfare and are therefore affected directly by the manner in which management conducts the
corporation's affairs"). See generally Mitchell, supra note 1, at 580 (documenting noticeable
trend "toward detaching corporation's board of directors from its traditional, bipolar rela-
tionship with the corporation's stockholders"). Nonshareholder corporate constituencies include
the corporation's creditors, employees, suppliers, community, and others. Katherine Van Wezel
Stone, Employees as Stakeholders Under State Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 21
STETSON L. REv. 45, 45 (1991). They are also commonly known as "stakeholders." Nell
Minnow, Shareholders, Stakeholders, and Boards of Directors, 21 STETSON L. REV. 197, 218
(1991).
5. See Mitchell, supra note 1, at 590 (suggesting that law match up situations with
beneficiaries of fiduciary duties, marking off when directors' duties run to each corporate
constituency). As an example of an instance where a nonshareholder group's interests are
implicated uniquely, take the conflicting interests of shareholders and creditors of a financially
troubled corporation. See Credit Lyonnais v. Pathe Communications Corp., Civ. A. No.
12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *36 n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991) (presenting hypothetical of
almost insolvent corporation whose creditors and shareholders have opposing interests). As a
corporation nears insolvency, the value of the shareholders' interests diminishes and the
shareholders' appetite for risk grows. Id. At the same time, however, the creditors' interest in
the corporation's ability to pay its debts becomes more acute and their appetite for risk is
likely to be considerably smaller than that of the shareholders. Id. In that situation, it is the
creditors' capital that is truly at stake and the fiduciary duties of corporate directors should
reflect that reality. Id.
6. See Stone, supra note 4, at 45-47 (asserting that nonshareholders experience harm
when directors protect shareholders' interests in making decisions about major corporate
changes); see also Morey W. McDaniel, Stockholders and Stakeholders, 21 STETSON L. REV.
121, 156-57 (1991) (arguing that stakeholders cannot protect their interests contractually or
statutorily); Steven M.H. Wallman, The Proper Interpretation of Corporate Constituency
Statutes and Formulation of Director Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 163, 189-91 (1991) (same).
7. See Johnson, Meaning of Corporate Life, supra note 1, at 867 (observing that law
is questioning reason for modern corporation's being); Millon, supra note 4, at 225 (articulating
modern understanding that corporation's role in society is more complex than merely "share-
holder wealth maximization"); Marketplace, supra note 1 (reporting that corporate thinkers
are re-examining corporate purpose).
8. See infra note 9 and accompanying text (listing 28 states' legislative attempts to make
corporate management responsive to needs of all stakeholders); infra notes 13-25, 89-108
(outlining judicial efforts in Delaware to increase director attention to interests of nonshare-
holder constituencies).
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Nonshareholder corporate constituency statutes are, as one commentator
put it, "the most obvious feature of th[is] reordering of the corporate legal
landscape." 9 However, these statutes may well exacerbate the problem they
purportedly seek to address. 0 By allowing but not requiring corporate
directors to consider the interests of nonshareholders, and by not identifying
situations in which directors should give special consideration to particular
groups' interests, the majority of these statutes actually serve to expand
directorial discretion.11 The broad sweep of nonshareholder corporate con-
stituency statutes, the discretionary tone most of them employ, and their
failure to include enforcement provisions effectively leave corporate boards
accountable to no one, not even the shareholders. 2
9. Mitchell, supra note 1, at 610. Twenty-eight states have enacted nonshareholder
constituency statutes. ARiz. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 10-1202 (Supp. 1991); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 33-313(e) (West Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.0830 (3) (West Supp. 1992); GA CODE
ANN. § 14-2-202(b)(5) (Michie 1991); HAw. REv. STAT. § 415-35(b) (Supp. 1990); IDAHO CODE
§§ 30-1602, 30-1702 (Supp. 1991); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, 8.85 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991);
IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(d), (f), (g) (West 1991); IowA CODE ANN. §491.01B (West 1991);
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 271B.12-210(4) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 12:92(G)(2) (West Supp. 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A § 716 (West Supp. 1991);
MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251(5) (West Supp. 1992); Miss. CODE ANN. §79-4-8.30(d) (Supp.
1990); Mo. Ray. STAT. 351.347 (West Supp. 1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2035(c) (Supp. 1990);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-A:6-1(2), 6-14(4) (West Supp. 1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-35(D)
(Supp. 1991); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717 (b) (McKinney Supp. 1991); Owo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1701.59(E) (Baldwin Supp. 1990); OR. REv. STAT. § 60.357(5) (1989); 15 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 1715 (1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-5.2-8 (Supp. 1991); S.D. CODIFED LAWS ANN. § 47-33-4
(Supp. 1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-35-204 (1988); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.0827 (West Supp.
1991); Wyo. STAT. § 17-16-830(e) (1977) (enacted 1989).
The typical statute allows the board of directors to consider the interests of nonshareholder
members of the corporate enterprise such as the managers, creditors, employees, suppliers,
and community. See James J. Hanks, Jr., Playing With Fire: Nonshareholder Constituency
Statutes in the 1990s, 21 STETSON L. REv. 97, 115-16 (1991) (describing typical statute); Stone,
supra note 4, at 45-47 (listing nonshareholder constituencies that statutes typically protect). By
contrast, Connecticut's nonshareholder corporate constituency statute is mandatory, requiring
the board to consider the interests of those groups. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §33-313(e) (West
Supp. 1991).
10. See Stone, supra note 4, at 45-47 (explaining that nonshareholder constituency statutes
aim to shield nonshareholders from harm they experience when directors protect shareholders'
interests in making decisions about major corporate changes). But see Wallman, supra note
6, at 188-89 (contending that nonshareholder constituency statutes do not intend to create
fiduciary duties running to stakeholders); infra notes 111-15 and accompanying text (discussing
decreased director accountability and increased director protection under statutes). See generally
McDaniel, supra note 6, at 122 n.2 (1991) (describing controversy over nonshareholder corporate
constituency statutes and cataloguing articles in favor of them and against them).
11. Only one of the twenty-eight nonshareholder constituency statutes uses mandatory
language. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 33-313(e) (1991).
12. See Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making
Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV.
23, 24 (1991) (asserting that nonshareholder corporate constituency statutes "effect alarming
changes" in officer and director accountability to shareholders); Mitchell, supra note 1, at 580
(citing concerns of Commissioner of Securities Exchange Commission and ABA Business Law
Section that constituency statutes grant authority without accountability and create potential
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Recent decisions under Delaware's common law of corporations offer
greater hope for more modest, yet more effective, implementation of the
philosophical shift away from the traditional conceptualization of the cor-
poration. 3 Most importantly, in late 1991, in footnote fifty-five of Credit
Lyonnais v. Pathe Communications Corp. , 4 Chancellor William Allen of
the Delaware Court of Chancery addressed the potential for conflicting
interests among corporate constituencies.s Less manipulable than the non-
shareholder corporate constituency statutes, Chancellor Allen's footnote
fifty-five is potentially a better shield for the interests of stakeholders other
than shareholders. 6 Like the statutes, Credit Lyonnais's footnote fifty-five
indicates that directors should be allowed to consider the concerns of all
stakeholders, but it apparently also goes further and requires the board to
consider certain stakeholders' concerns under certain circumstances.
7
Chancellor Allen explained in footnote fifty-five that the interests of
the entire corporate enterprise, not just the shareholders, provide the proper
for directorial mischief); infra notes 111-15, 149-56 and accompanying text (discussing how
permissive nonshareholder constituency statutes practically eliminate board accountability).
The reader should note that even under the traditional model, the operation of the
business judgment rule prevents courts from analyzing the merits of board decisions, thus
weakening accountability of the board to the shareholders. See infra note 42 (explaining
business judgment rule); see also Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780 (Ill. App. 1968)
(holding that absent fraud, illegality or conflict of interest, board decisions are not reviewable
by courts).
13. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989)
(holding that aside from short-term shareholder gain, long-term preservation of "Time culture"
is corporate interest that board may consider when evaluating takeover threat); Unocal Corp.
v. Mesa Corp., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (suggesting that in board decision whether to
defend against takeover attempt, interests of entire corporate enterprise, not just shareholders,
are at stake); Credit Lyonnais v. Pathe Communications Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150, 1991 WL
277613, at *34 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991) (indicating that directors should consider "entire
corporate enterprise" in decisionmaking process); see also infra notes 89-108 and accompanying
text (outlining judicial trend in Delaware towards increased directorial protection of interests
of entire corporate enterprise).
14. Civ. A. No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
15. Credit Lyonnais v. Pathe Communications Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150, 1991 WL
277613, at *36 n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
16. See infra notes 137-42 and accompanying text (arguing that using creditors of insolvent
corporations as example, in footnote 55, Chancellor Allen may have begun to create situation-
specific duties for corporate directors).
17. See Credit Lyonnais, 1991 WL 277613, at *34 (holding that "[alt least where a
corporation is operating in the vicinity of insolvency, a board of directors is not merely the
agent of the residue risk-bearers, but owes its duties to the corporate enterprise") (emphasis
added); Gregory V. Varallo & Jesse A. Finkelstein, Fiduciary Obligations of Directors of the
Financially Troubled Company, 48 Bus. LAW. 239, 241 (1992) (acknowledging Credit Lyonnais's
creation of duties to nonshareholder constituencies-especially creditors-of financially troubled
corporations); see also Walman, supra note 6, at 188 (arguing that statutes do not intend to
create directorial fiduciary duties running to nonshareholders). But see Stone, supra note 4,
at 47 (maintaining that statutes, as well as case law, create directorial fiduciary duties running
to nonshlareholders).
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frame of reference for a director making decisions on Behalf of a solvent
corporation nearing insolvency. 8 The Chancellor also recognized that when
a corporation is teetering on the verge of insolvency, the interests of the
corporate creditors are particularly pertinent. 9 Thus, Chancellor Allen im-
plied that in a given decisionmaking process, the identity of the beneficiaries
18. Credit Lyonnais, 1991 WL 277613, at *36 n.55. Footnote 55 reads as follows:
The possibility of insolvency can do curious things to incentives, exposing creditors
to risks of opportunistic behavior and creating complexities for directors. Consider,
for example, a solvent corporation having a single asset, a judgment for $51 million
against a solvent debtor. The judgment is on appeal and thus subject to modification
or reversal. Assume that the only liabilities of the company are to the bondholders
in the amount of $12 million. Assume that the array of probable outcomes on
appeal is as follows:
Expected Value
25% chance of affirmance ($51mm) $12.75
70% chance of modification ($4mm) 2.8
5% chance of reversal ($0) 0
Expected Value of Judgment on Appeal $15.55
Thus, the best evaluation is that the current value of the equity is $3.55 million
($15.55 million expected value of judgment on appeal - $12 million liability to
bondholders). Now assume an offer to settle at $125 million (also consider one at
$17.5 million). By what standard do the directors of the company evaluate the
fairness of these offers? The creditors of this solvent company would be in favor
of accepting either a $12.5 million or a $17.5 million offer. In either event they will
avoid the 75% risk of insolvency and default. The stockholders, however, will be
plainly opposed to acceptance of a $12.5 million offer (under which they get
practically nothing). More importantly, they very well may be opposed to acceptance
of the $17.5 million offer under which the residual value of the corporation would
increase from $3.5 to $5.5 million. This is so because the litigation alternative, with
its 25% probability of $39 million outcome to them ($51 million - $12 million =
$39 million) has an expected value to the residual risk bearer of $9.75 million ($39
million x 25% chance of affirmance), substantially greater than the $5.5 million
available to them in the settlement. While in fact the stockholders' preference would
reflect their appetite for risk, it is possible (and with diversified shareholders likely)
that shareholders would prefer rejection of both settlement offers.
But if we consider the community of interests that the corporation represents it
seems apparent that one should in this hypothetical accept the best settlement offer
available provided it is greater than $15.5 million, and one below that amount should
be rejected. But that result will not be reached by a director who thinks he owes
duties directly to the shareholders only. It will be reached by directors who are
capable of conceiving of the corporation as a legal and economic entity. Such
directors will recognize that in managing the business affairs of a solvent corporation
in the vicinity of insolvency, circumstances may arise when the right (both the
efficient and the fair) course to follow for the corporation may diverge from the
choice that the stockholders (or the creditors, or the employees, or any single group
interested in the corporation) would make if given the opportunity to act.
1d.; see also infra note 101 (listing support for Chancellor Allen's view that directorial fiduciary
duties run to entire corporate enterprise).
19. See Credit Lyonnais, 1991 WL 277613, at *36 n.55 (stating that possibility of
insolvency exposes creditors to "risks of opportunistic behavior").
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of the directors' fiduciary duties should depend on the specific corporate
circumstances.20
Because a corporation's creditors are the primary stakeholders in the
situation of near insolvency, Chancellor Allen suggested that in discharging
their fiduciary duties, directors of financially troubled corporations should
be especially protective of the creditors' interests. 2' Under other circum-
stances, the corporation's employees, for example, may be the constituency
that managerial misconduct stands to hit the hardest.2? When that is the
case, by extension of the logic of footnote fifty-five, the board should be
most solicitous in sheltering the employees' interests. 2
With Credit Lyonnais's footnote fifty-five, Chancellor Allen has nudged
Delaware law in the direction of establishing directorial fiduciary duties
running to nonshareholders in at least some circumstances. Footnote fifty-
five could therefore represent a major turning point in the law of corpo-
rations in Delaware and elsewhere?21 Unfortunately, however, it leaves two
crucial questions unanswered.
The first omission concerns the scope of the footnote's applicability.
To what class of situations did Chancellor Allen intend his reasoning in
footnote fifty-five to extend? On the surface at least, the footnote appears
limited in its application and noncommittal in its tone. 6 Clearly, the
20. See id. (indicating that directors should recognize that "circumstances may arise
when the right ... course to follow for the corporation may diverge from the choice that the
stockholders (. . . or any single group interested in the corporation) would make if given the
opportunity to act") (emphasis added).
21. See id. (stating that possibility of insolvency exposes creditors to "risks of oppor-
tunistic behavior" and using hypothetical to show that directors of almost insolvent corporation
should protect creditors' interests even if such action is in opposition to shareholders' interests).
22. See Marleen A. O'Connor, Restructuring the Corporation's Nexus of Contracts:
Recognizing a Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1189, 1203-10
(1991) (arguing that when corporations are considering restructurings and plant closings,
directors' fiduciary duties should run to employees); Stone, supra note 4, at 45 (observing that
employees are most often cited as constituency in need of protection).
23. See Mitchell, supra note 1, at 590 (arguing in favor of situation-specific directorial
fiduciary duties). This Note does not purport to identify specific factual circumstances under
which corporate directors' fiduciary duties should shift from being owed to the shareholders
to being owed to another specific constituency. Rather, this Note attempts to place Credit
Lyonnais's footnote 55 into its legal context and demonstrate its potential as an instrument
for courts to use in extending existing principles or creating new doctrine.
24. See supra note 18 (quoting footnote 55 of Credit Lyonnais).
25. See Footnote of the Year Has Lawyers Wondering About the Zone of Insolvency,
24 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 388, 388 (Mar. 20, 1992) [hereinafter Footnote of the Year]
(reporting that footnote 55 "appears to indicate a deviation from well-settled Delaware
principles"). The potential change in Delaware law carries added significance because many
consider Delaware the source of American corporation law. See, e.g., Douglas M. Branson,
Indeterminacy: The Final Ingredient in an Interest Group Analysis of Corporate Law, 43
VAND. L. REV. 85, 87 (1990) (calling Delaware law "our national corporate law").
26. See supra note 18 (quoting footnote 55 of Credit Lyonnais). The footnote only
discusses the duties of directors of corporations on the verge of insolvency. Id. Moreover, the
footnote takes a normative approach, saying what a responsible director "should" do and not
1766
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Chancellor endorsed the corporate enterprise theory on some level and
invoked it in the near-insolvency context. 27 In so doing, he may have aimed
solely to expose and alleviate the plight of creditors of almost-insolvent
corporations, without recognizing any directorial duties to creditors or other
nonshareholders under any other circumstances.2 On the other hand, Chan-
cellor Allen may have used the predicament of corporate creditors in the
near-insolvency situation as an example to make the broader point that the
identity of the beneficiaries of directorial duties should vary as a function
of the subject matter of the decision facing the board. 29 Thus, the Chancellor
may have meant to indicate that board action should reflect an awareness
of which stakeholders have the most to lose if the directors embark on any
particular proposed course of action.30
The second and more significant omission of footnote fifty-five is its
failure to address whether the Delaware courts will couple the newly
recognized duties-whatever their scope-with a mechanism for their en-
forcement." While the footnote signals that corporate law may be turning
a philosophical corner, the turn will be useless, and the protection of the
interests of nonshareholders will remain a fiction, as long as shareholders
are the only corporate constituency with standing to enforce directors"
fiduciary obligations.3 2 If standing to bring a derivative suit remains available
exclusively to the corporation's shareholders, only theorists and academics
will enjoy the ground Chancellor Allen broke with Credit Lyonnais's foot-
what she "must" do. Id. But see Varallo & Finkelstein, supra note 17, at 241 (calling what
Chancellor Allen created in footnote 55 directorial fiduciary "duties" to nonshareholder
members of corporate enterprise on verge of insolvency).
27. See Daniel J. Winnike, Credit Lyonnais: An Aberration or an Enhancement of
Creditors' Rights in Delaware, 6 INslonn's 31 (July 1992) (stating that footnote 55 expands
range of situations in which directors are fiduciaries of creditors to include near insolvency);
supra note 18 (quoting footnote 55 as statingothat directors should be "capable of conceiving
of the corporation as a legal and economic entity" and should consider "community of
interests").
28. See supra note 18 (quoting footnote 55 of Credit Lyonnais).
29. See Credit Lyonnals v. Pathe Communications Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150, 1991 WL
277613, at *36 n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991) (holding that "in the management of the business
affairs of a solvent corporation in the vicinity of insolvency, circumstances may arise when
the right ... course to follow for the corporation may diverge from the choice that ... any
single group interested in the corporation would make if given the opportunity to act")
(emphasis added).
30. See McDaniel, supra note 6, at 146-47 (maintaining that while stakeholder statutes
presently confer no legally enforceable rights, perhaps courts will later "recognize that directors
owe enforceable duties to some stakeholders in some cases, particularly primary stakeholders
when they are being expropriated") (emphasis added); Mitchell, supra note 1, at 590 (arguing
in favor of situation-specific directorial fiduciary duties).
31. See Footnote of the Year, supra note 25, at 388-89 (reporting that members of
Delaware bar are questioning what if any enforcement mechanism footnote 55's duties will
carry).
32. See id. (describing footnote 55 as "deviation from well-settled Delaware principles,"
but asking "where in the practical world a party can obtain a remedy" for breach of the
footnote's principles).
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note fifty-five. Neither creditors nor other stakeholders will be able to utilize
the footnote's rationale to safeguard their corporate interests.
3
After outlining some of the basic legal tenets of the traditional model
of corporate governance, this Note examines the effects of the nonshare-
holder corporate constituency statutes and the effects of the Delaware case
law that advances the corporate enterprise notion. An analysis of two
alternative readings of Credit Lyonnais's footnote fifty-five then follows.
Finally, the Note concludes that under either reading, footnote fifty-five's
lack of an enforcement mechanism renders ethereal the benefit it confers
upon creditors or all nonshareholder constituencies.
II. THE TRADITIONAL MODEL OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
To traditional corporate law theorists, making profit for investors is
the singular normative focus of the corporation.3 4 In other words, the reason
for corporate existence is to maximize shareholder wealth 5 Because the
shareholders are said to "own" the corporation, conventional corporate
theory maintains that their interests are the interests of the corporation.
3 6
Accordingly, under the traditional model of corporate governance, directors
conducting a corporation's affairs should have a sole objective: boosting
shareholder gain.
3 7
A. Directors' Fiduciary Duties Under the Traditional Model
The traditional model's broad notion that the corporate purpose in
society is to increase shareholder profits necessarily colors its more specific
determination of the relative rights and duties of the various players on the
corporate field. The model binds the directors to the corporation and its
shareholders38 by a duty of loyalty and a duty of care. 39 In keeping with
33. But see id. at 388-89 (suggesting that dootnote 55's corporate enterprise concept is
foundation for argument that nonshareholders should have access to derivative suit).
34. See Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 256 (7th Cir. 1986)
(holding that traditional goal of corporation in capitalistic society is "stockholder wealth
maximization"), rev'd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 69. (1987); see also Millon, supra note 2,
at 903, 911-18 (pointing out that for past several decades, legal theory has held that "[a]
corporation exists for the financial benefit of its shareholders [and] management must devote
itself to this single purpose with relentless fidelity"; describing development of traditional
model's shareholder primacy principle which culminated in hostile takeover craze).
35. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (1919) (prohibiting director action
designed to create jobs and make less expensive cars because those goals did not comport with
singular corporate purpose of advancing profit-making interests of shareholders); Adolph A.
Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARv. L. REv. 1365, 1367
(1932) (stating that corporations exist for sole purpose of making profits for their stockholders).
36. See Mitchell, supra note 1, at 586 (citing traditional model's abiding theory that
shareholders own corporation as reason for law's equating corporate interests with shareholder
interests). But see McDaniel, supra note 6, at 149-50 (arguing that modern corporation is
nexus of contracts and has no owners).
37. See infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text (discussing Revlon v. McAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) and its absolute shareholder primacy principle).
38. See Mills Acquisition Co. v. McMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del. 1989)
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the traditional philosophical position that increasing shareholder profits is
the singular corporate aim, however, the law equates the corporation with
its shareholders.40 Thus, under the law of Delaware and other states, courts
often state that the directors are fiduciaries of the shareholders. 4 The
board's fiduciary role vis-h-vis the shareholders limits the actions that the
directors legitimately can take.42
The board of directors of a solvent corporation does not owe fiduciary
duties to other corporate stakeholders, such as creditors. 43 In fact, according
(holding that directors owe fiduciary duties to "corporation and its shareholders"); Revlon v.
McAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (same); Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985) (same); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del.
1939) (same); WILIU.W E. KNEPPER, LIABILITY OF CORPORAa OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS § 1.06,
at 12 (3d ed. 1978) (reciting generally accepted rule that directors occupy special fiduciary
relationship to corporation and its shareholders).
Cases holding that directors owe fiduciary duties to the corporation and the shareholders
refer to the shareholders as a unit; no directors' fiduciary duties run to the shareholders
individually. See In re Black, 787 F.2d 503 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding that shareholders are
collective, not individual, beneficiaries of directors' fiduciary duties).
The notion that directors owe fiduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders
may not be entirely accurate. See infra note 101 (listing support for position that directors are
fiduciaries of corporation itself).
39. See Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264 (2d Cir. 1984) (stating
that directors owe duty of loyalty and duty of care); In re Suburban Motor Freight, Inc., 124
B.R. 984, 1004 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990) (same); Air Line Pilots Association Int'l. v. UAL
Corp., 717 F. Supp. 575, 581 (N.D. Il1. 1989) (same); MARc J. LANE, REPRESENTING CORPORATE
OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS 44 (1987) (same); Alfred F. Conard, A Behavioral Analysis of
Directors' Liability for Negligence, 1972 DuKE L.J. 895, 895 (same).
The duty of loyalty requires directors to act in good faith and in the corporation's best
interest. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 180; Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983).
In its typical formulation, the duty of care requires a director to exercise the care that an
ordinary prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances. REVISED
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a)(2). In Delaware, the duty of care demands that directors
exercise diligence and an informed business judgment. Balotti & Gentile, Director Liability for
Delaware Corporations, 12 DEL. J; CORP. L. 5, 15 (1987).
40. Mitchell, supra note 1, at 586-87; see also infra note 64 (describing Professor
Mitchell's theory that public misconception that shareholders are sole beneficiaries of directors'
duties is outgrowth of traditional model's standing rules).
41. See Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300, 304 (Del. 1988) (stating that directors owe
duties to shareholders because ownership is basis for fiduciary duty). But see Mitchell, supra
note 1, at 580-81 (characterizing idea that shareholders are exclusive beneficiaries of directors'
fiduciary duties as notion that needs to be put to rest); infra note 101 (listing support for
position that directors are corporation's fiduciaries).
42. Courts assess the corporate director's duties in light of the "business judgment rule,"
a judicial presumption that in making a business decision, the directors have acted in good
faith and in a manner they reasonably believe to be in the best interests of the corporation.
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). Therefore, some argue that the limits that
directorial fiduciary duties place on the actions of directors are minimal. See Macey, supra
note 12, at 24 (implying that even if nonshareholders become beneficiaries of fiduciary duties,
business judgment rule will protect most directors' actions, making the duties less valuable).
43. See In re Revco D.S., Inc., 118 B.R. 468, 507-08 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990) (noting
that Delaware courts consistently have refused to recognize that corporate directors owe
creditors fiduciary duties); Browning Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 454 F.
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to a fairly recent Delaware Supreme Court decision, Revlon v. McAndrews
& Forbes Holdings, Inc.,44 the law actually forbids directors of a solvent
corporation from acting out of concern for the interests of other corporate
constituencies when such action would be inconsistent with their duties to
the shareholders. 45 Under Revlon, only when concern for other corporate
constituencies will cause the accrual of some rationally related benefit to
the stockholders is director action based on such concern proper. 46 In other
words, the directors' duties run to the shareholders exclusively. 47
The Delaware Supreme Court's holding in Revlon comports with Chan-
cellor Allen's holding just three days earlier in Katz v. Oak Industries.4 In
Katz, Chancellor Allen wrote the following with regard to directors' duties
in the face of conflicting interests of shareholders and creditors:
It is the obligation of the directors to attempt, within the law, to
maximize the long-run interests of the corporation's stockholders;
that they may sometimes do so "at the expense" of others ...
does not for that reason constitute a breach of duty. It seems likely
that corporate restructurings designed to maximize shareholder val-
ues may in some instances have the effect of requiring bondholders
to bear greater risk of loss and thus in effect transfer economic
value from bondholders to stockholders.
49
Unsheltered by the same broad fiduciary duties that corporate shareholders
enjoy from the directors, corporate creditors must, under the traditional
model, look to the terms of their contracts with the corporation for
determination of their rights and for protection from director mismanage-
ment. 0 In Katz, Chancellor Allen articulated the prevailing explanation for
extending only contractual protection to creditors."' He wrote that because
agreements between a corporation and its creditors typically are negotiated
thoroughly and documented extensively, the rights and obligations of each
party should be evident from the documentation.5 2 Therefore, the contractual
Supp. 88, 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (stating legal conclusion that neither corporation nor directors
owe fiduciary duties of any kind to corporate creditors); Kessler v. General Cable Corp., 155
Cal. Rptr. 94, 103 (App. Dep't. Super. Ct. 1979) (opining that to declare that director could
breach fiduciary duty owed to corporate creditors "w~uld constitute an expansion at divergence
with much of the current case law"); see also McDaniel, supra note 6, at 146 n.89 (listing
articles that favor and articles that oppose idea of directors owing fiduciary duties to creditors).
44. 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986).
45. Revlon v. McAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 176 (Del. 1986); see
also Minnow, supra note 4, at 217 n.78 (noting that traditional corporate law permits concern
about nonshareholder constituencies, but only "in the context of the shareholders").
46. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 176.
47. Id.
48. 508 A.2d 873 (Del. Ch. 1986).
49. Katz v. Oak Indus., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986).
50. See id. (holding that corporate directors owe no extra-contractual protection to
corporate creditors); Harff v. Kerkorian, 324 A.2d 215, 219 (Del. Ch. 1974) (holding that
contracts determine creditors' rights), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 347 A.2d
133 (Del. 1975).
51. Katz, 508 A.2d at 879.
52. Id.; See also Hanks, Playing With Fire, supra note 9, at 115-16 (maintaining that
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terms to which both parties have agreed and not any broader notion, such
as fairness or equity, should dictate the corporation's obligation to its
creditors .
53
Even with the traditional model of corporate governance firmly in place,
Delaware courts have carved out an "insolvency exception" to the rule that
directors do not owe fiduciary duties to corporate creditors.5 4 The rationale
behind the exception is that insolvency is a "special circumstance" war-
ranting departure from the general rule that directors do not owe creditors
duties beyond the relevant contractual terms."5 Once a corporation reaches
insolvency, traditional legal theory recognizes the vulnerability of corporate
creditors and requires that the corporation's directors protect the interests
of its creditors.
56
Recently, in Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications Co.,57 the Delaware Court
of Chancery reiterated the insolvency exception, holding that insolvency
creates fiduciary duties on the part of directors for the benefit of creditors.58
The issue in Geyer was whether, for purposes of creating those fiduciary
nonshareholders-especially creditors and employees-do not need protection of directorial
fiduciary duties because other protection is available to them: "economic interests of employees,
for example, are protected by minimum Wage, safety, health and plant-closing laws, and in
many cases, collective bargaining agreements [and] [c]reditors are protected by fraudulent
conveyance, preference and bulk transfer statutes as well as by contract"); Hideki Kanda,
Debtholders and Equityholders, 21 J. LEGAL STuDiEs 431, 440 (1992) (arguing that debtholding
should remain creature of contract with individual debtholders choosing contractual terms
consistent with debtholder's own perception of risk involved in making loan); Macey, supra
note 12, at 36-37 (arguing that shareholders have most need for directors' fiduciary allegiances
because shareholders face "more daunting contracting problems than other constituencies" do,
and describing as "flawed and without merit" argument that employees' contracts with
corporation reflect employees' lack of bargaining power). But see McDaniel, supra note 6, at
156-57 (taking issue with argument that stakeholders can protect their interests contractually
or statutorily); Stone, supra note 4, at 54-69 (arguing that contract-based solutions do not
offer adequate protection for corporate employees in many situations); Wallman, supra note
6, at 189-91 (same).
53. Katz v. Oak Indus., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986).
54. See Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications Co., Civ. A. No. 12406, 1992 WL 136743, at *3
(Del. Ch. June 18, 1992) (characterizing insolvency exception as undisputed); Harff v. Ker-
korian, 324 A.2d 215, 219 (Del. Ch. 1974) (recognizing insolvency exception), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part on other grounds, 347 A.2d 133 (Del. 1975). But see Victor Brudney, Corporate
Bondholders and Debtor Opportunism: In Bad Times and Good, 105 HA~v. L. REv. 1821,
1843 n.68 (1992) (questioning doctrinal basis for insolvency exception and noting that courts
do not frequently invoke it).
55. Harff, 324 A.2d at 219. In addition to insolvency, other "special circumstances"
warranting a departure from the traditional rule that directors are not fiduciaries of creditors
include fraud, and a director's violation of statute. Id.
56. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Minges, 473 F.2d 918, 921 (4th Cir. 1973); Geyer, 1992
WL 136743, at *2; Harff, 324 A.2d at 219; see also Millon, supra note 2, at 910 (explaining
that insolvency exception grew out of nineteenth century understanding that creditors of
insolvent corporations are particularly vulnerable).
57. Civ. A. No. 12406, 1992 WL 136743 (Del. Ch. June 18, 1992).
58. Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications Co., Civ. A. No. 12406, 1992 WL 136743, at *2
(Del. Ch. June 18, 1992).
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duties, insolvency occurs at the moment of insolvency-in-fact or at the
institution of statutory proceedings.5 9 In confronting that question, the court
explained that underlying the exception is the idea that a corporation's
reaching insolvency results in the creation of a trust for the benefit of the
corporate creditors.60 Based on Delaware precedent and on the ordinary
meaning of the word "insolvency," the court then held that it is the fact
of insolvency-achieved at the moment when the corporation's liabilities
exceed its assets6 1 -that causes the trust to arise.
62
B. Standing to Sue for Breach of Directors' Fiduciary Duties Under the
Traditional Model
As a corollary to the idea that shareholders are the only beneficiaries
of directorial fiduciary duties,63 the traditional law allows only the share-
holders, as "owners" of the corporation, to maintain derivative suits on
the corporation's behalf for breach of the directors' fiduciary duties. 4
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.; see also Bovay v. H.M. Byllesby & Co., 38 A.2d 808, 813 (Del. 1944) (citing
McDonald v. Williams, 174 U.S. 397 (1899), in which Court defined insolvency as having
fewer assets than liabilities).
62. Geyer, 1992 WL 136743, at *2. F
63. See Revlon v. McAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 176 (Del. 1986)
(holding that shareholders are exclusive beneficiaries of directors' fiduciary duties). But see
infra note 64 (providing Professor Mitchell's argument that traditional model's standing rules
caused inaccuracy in public understanding of fiduciary duties).
64. See Kaufman v. Dreyfus Fund, Inc., 434 F.2d 727, 735 (3d Cir. 1970) (recognizing
"unambiguous requirement-amounting to a legal principle" that nonshareholder cannot bring
derivative action), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971); Kusner v. First Pa. Corp., 395 F. Supp.
276, 280-83 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (holding that only shareholders have requisite legal standing to
bring derivative suit on behalf of corporation); Dorfman v. Chem. Bank, 56 F.R.D. 363, 364
(S.D.N.Y. 1972) (requiring shareholder status for standing to bring derivative suit); Lawrence
E. Mitchell, Fairness Rights of Corporate Bondholders, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1165, 1192-93
(1990) (noting that stockholder standing to bring derivative suit is based on idea that stock-
holders own corporation); infra note 66 and accompanying text (discussing proprietary interest
required for standing to bring derivative suits on corporation's behalf). But see McDaniel,
supra note 6, at 149-50 (arguing that modem corporation is nexus of contracts and has no
owners).
Professor Mitchell argues that the standing rules are the reason for the prevalence of the
mistaken views that the purpose of the corporation is to generate profits for its shareholders
and that the corporate directors' fiduciary duties run exclusively to the shareholders. Mitchell,
supra note 1, at 606-07. According to Professor Mitchell, the directors of a corporation, at
least theoretically, owe fiduciary duties to the corporation as a whole. See id. at 580-81
(characterizing idea that shareholders are exclusive beneficiaries of directors' fiduciary duties
as notion that needs to be put to rest); see also infra note 101 (listing support for Chancellor
Allen's statement that fiduciary duties of corporate directors run to entire corporate enterprise).
Even so, the law only grants to the corporation's shareholders standing to bring derivative
suits on behalf of the corporation for breach of those fiduciary duties. By enabling only a
single group within the corporate enterprise to enforce the directors' duties, the law in effect
creates the incentive for the corporate directors to act as though the shareholder's interests
comprise the whole of the corporation's interests. Mitchell, supra note 1, at 606-07. Because
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Courts therefore deny derivative standing to creditors of solvent corpora-
tions.6 As justification for refusing creditors access to the derivative suit,
courts generally hold either that creditors lack the requisite proprietary
interest in the corporation" or that as nonowners, creditors lack the injury
needed to confer standing. 67
Oddly, even upon corporate insolvency, when courts recognize a direc-
torial duty running to creditors, 68 these standing rules do not effectively
yield. 69 Although a few courts have indicated that when the insolvency
only the shareholders can wield the threat of litigation, directors, in the interest of avoiding
litigation, are motivated to act as though they are answerable only to the shareholders. Id.
Thus, Professor Mitchell asserts, the idea emerged under the traditional model of corporate
governance that the shareholders are the corporation, and therefore that the fiduciary duties
which corporate directors owe to the corporation actually run exclusively to the shareholders
as a group. Id.; see also infra note 101 (observing that characterizing shareholder suits as
"derivative" blatantly contradicts idea that directors owe fiduciary duties to shareholders rather
than to corporation as a whole).
Because of the business judgment rule, the derivative suit is arguably an inadequate
enforcement mechanism even for shareholders. See supra note 42 (explaining business judgment
rule). Therefore, if other stakeholders ultimately get the benefit of standing to enforce the
fiduciary duties, the business judgment rule will likely allow directors to quash their claims
too. See Macey, supra note 12, at 24 (arguing that if because of nonshareholder corporate
constituency statutes, nonshareholders gain some of shareholders' rights as beneficiaries of
directorial fiduciary duties, shareholder loss would not be great because business judgment
rule effectively protects most board actions from shareholder scrutiny anyway).
65. See Harff v. Kerkorian, 324 A.2d 215, 219 (Del. Ch. 1974) (explaining that debenture
holders are creditors and therefore do not have standing because stockholder status is essential
to the maintenance of derivative suit), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds (Del.
1975); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 1979 WL 2697, at *2 (Del. Ch. 1979) (holding that where
by virtue of terms of merger, shareholder of now defunct corporation is converted into creditor
of surviving corporation, shareholder no longer has standing to maintain derivative action on
behalf of defunct corporation); Note, Creditors' Derivative Suits on Behalf of Solvent Cor-
porations, 88 YALE L.J. 1299, 1300 (1979) (commenting that law generally does not allow
creditors to maintain derivative suits while corporation is still solvent).
66. See Kusner 395 F. Supp. at 280-83 (holding that limitation of standing to persons
with proprietary interest justifies barring creditors' suits); Brooks v. Weiser, 57 F.R.D. 491,
494 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (reiterating "obvious" proposition that right to sue derivatively is attribute
of ownership).
67. See, e.g., Appleton v. American Malting Co., 54 A. 454, 456 (N.J. 1903) (reasoning
that creditors can suffer no injury from illegal payment of dividends unless capital is so
impaired as to render company insolvent); Frederick G. Kempin, Jr., Enforcement of Man-
agement's Duties to Corporate Creditors, 6 AM. Bus. L.J. 371, 377-78 (1968) (suggesting that
creditors could never have requisite injury to confer standing to sue solvent corporation
derivatively because if creditors are injured corporation must, by definition, be unable to pay
its debts).
68. See Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications Co., Civ. A. No. 12406, 1992 WL 136743, at *3
(Del. Ch. June 18, 1992) (recognizing that upon corporate insolvency, creditors become
beneficiaries of directors' fiduciary duties); Harff v. Kerkorian, 324 A.2d 215, 222 (Del. Ch.
1974) (explaining that insolvency is special circumstance that causes directors' duties to run to
creditors), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 347 A.2d 133 (Del. 1975).
69. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text (explaining that under traditional
model, standing to sue directors on corporation's behalf is function of ownership and thus
limited to shareholders). When insolvency occurs, the board owes fiduciary obligations to
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exception applies, a creditor's derivative suit theoretically is appropriate,7 0
no reported cases appear to exist in which a creditor of an insolvent
corporation successfully has asserted standing to maintain a derivative suit
to enforce directorial fiduciary duties. The procedural issue of creditors'
deriyative standing did not arise in Geyer.7 ' In that case, the defendant
moved to dismiss on the grounds that the Delaware Court of Chancery
lacked personal jurisdiction over him because he was a resident of Connec-
ticut. 7 2 The defendant argued that the statute under which the plaintiff
purported to accomplish service of process upon him" limits service on
nonresident directors to suits for breach of fiduciary duties. 74 The defendant
further maintained that because directors' fiduciary duties do not run to
corporate creditors unless the circumstances have triggered the insolvency
exception, the service was invalid. 7" Thus, the narrow issue before the court
in Geyer was not whether the plaintiff had standing to maintain a derivative
suit, but rather. whether the corporation had attained insolvency such that
the board's fiduciary duties had begun to run to the corporation's creditors.
76
III. DISsATIsFAcTION WITH THE PHILOSOPmHCAL UNDERPINNINGS OF
TRADITIoNAL MODEL
Today, many corporate law scholars are coming to believe that the
traditional model of corporate governance is an inadequate paradigm for
the modern corporation. 77 To them, the image of the corporation as a mere
creditors because insolvency transforms creditors into "owners." Brudney, supra note 54, at
1843 n.68. Therefore, the failure of the traditional standing rules to bend upon insolvency is
odd in light of the traditional model's link between "ownership" of the corporation and
standing to sue on its behalf.
70. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Minges, 473 F.2d 918, 920 (4th Cir. 1973) (holding
that when director of insolvent corporation fraudulently or negligently causes injury to
corporation and its creditors generally, creditor may maintain right of action on behalf of
corporation); Eskimo Pie Corp. v. Whitelawn Dairies, Inc., 266 F. Supp. 79, 82 (S.D.N.Y.
1967) (requiring that when seeking standing to sue derivatively, creditor must show at least
that debtor corporation is "notoriously insolvent"); see also Kempin, supra note 67, at 377-
78 (arguing that unless corporation is insolvent, there can be no reason for creditors' derivative
suit).
71. Geyer, 1992 WL 136743.
72. Id. at *2.
73. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3114 (Supp. 1990).
74. Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications Co., Civ. A. No. 12406, 1992 WL 136743, at *2
(Del. Ch. June 18, 1992).
75. Id.
76. Id. at *3.
77. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text (providing evidence of ideological change
in corporate law); see also Marketplace, supra note I (quoting business writer Charles Handy,
speaking on traditional corporate law). Mr. Handy stated,
We may have mistaken a requirement for a purpose. The requirement is to make a
profit, but to turn a requirement into a purpose is not right. We have to eat to
live, but if you live to eat you become a distorted human being in more senses than
one. We have to make a profit to survive, but that's not enough. What's the purpose
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aggregate of profit-seeking shareholders simply is not reflective of the current
corporation's actual place and pervasive influence in society.78 They argue
that in light of the significant effects of corporate decisionmaking on society
as a whole, to treat a corporation as nothing more than a conglomeration
of individual shareholders is to ignore the reality of the modern publicly
held corporation.
79
Critics of the traditional view maintain that because the modern cor-
poration is such an important participant in our society, corporate directors
should, during the decisionmaking process, consider a much wider array of
interests than just those of the shareholders. 0 Thus, to some, it is far from
obvious that the body of shareholders should be the singular beneficiary of
the corporate board's fiduciary duties. 8' Because corporate directors are
charged with managing the whole of the. modem publicly held corporation,1
2
the needs and interests of the "entire corporate enterprise" require the
board's attention. 3 Under this emerging thinking, then, the corporation is
a "community of interests," not limited to the shareholders' interests. 4 .
beyond the requirement?
Id.
Modern rejection of the shareholder-centered approach to corporate governance actually
signals a return to early ideas about the corporation. See Millon, supra note 2, at 903-11
(explaining that in nineteenth century, corporation law had broader focus and reflected serious
concerns about corporations' economic and political power; characterizing law's renewed
interest in nonshareholder concerns as rebirth); Wallman, supra note 6, at 168 (indicating that
nonshareholder corporate constituency statutes "bring director responsibility back to its roots
by demanding that directors act in the best interests of the corporation"); see also McDaniel,
supra note 6, at 151 (relating that "nineteenth century corporation law reflected a concern for
other constituencies and contained statutory protections (however feeble) for nonshareholders,
especially creditors and the general public"); Wallman, supra note 6, at 166-67 (explaining
policy behind nineteenth century corporation law).
78. See Johnson, Meaning of Corporate Life, supra note 1, at 934 (arguing that "[f]or
courts to embrace a radically proshareholder vision of corporate endeavor would be out of
line with prevailing social norms, however soothing that outcome might be for corporate law's
own peace of mind" and that "shareholder primacy does not ring true").
79. See Mitchell, supra note 1, at 584 (calling for corporate law to be more reflective
of corporations' societal role).
80. See McDaniel, supra note 6, at 137-39 (arguing in favor of creation of dual goal for
directors: maximizing shareholder gain and minimizing stakeholder loss); Wallman, supra note
6, at 189 (maintaining that shareholder-only model of Revlon mandates unfair transfers of
wealth from nonshareholders to shareholders). But see F.A. Hayek, Law, Legislation, Liberty,
in 3 Tan POLIICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE 82 (1979) (expressing concern that without
narrowly circumscribed class, of beneficiaries, corporate directors would be too powerful);
Minnow, supra note 4, at 218 (arguing that director fulfilling his duty to shareholders will
inevitably consider other stakeholders' interests).
81. See Stone, supra note 4, at 45-69 (arguing that directors' fiduciary duties should run
to employees); Mitchell, supra note 1, at 590 (arguing that directors' duties should be situation-
specific).
82. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991).
83. See infra note 101 (showing that view that board owes duties to corporation itself is
not new).
84. See Credit Lyonnais v. Pathe Communications Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150, 1991 WL
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Disapproval of the traditional, shareholder-centered portrait of the corpo-
ration and adherence to the newer "community of interests" or "corporate
enterprise" concept have caused both legislative and judicial change. 5
A. Legislative Manifestations of the Dissatisfaction: Nonshareholder
Corporate Constituency Statutes
The most striking examples of reformation attributable to the new
concern for nonshareholder members of the corporate enterprise are the
nonshareholder constituency statutes that the legislatures of twenty-eight
states have enacted.16 All but one of the statutes allow but do not require
directors making decisions on behalf of a corporation to consider the
interests of corporate constituencies other than the shareholders.17 For
purposes of the statutes, nonshareholder constituencies, otherwise known as
stakeholders, typically include the corporation's creditors, employees, sup-
pliers, community, and others.8
B. Judicial Manifestations of the Dissatisfaction: The Trend in the
Common Law of Delaware
The Delaware legislature89 has not passed a nonshareholder constituency
statute, but opinions of the state's courts provide proof that the philosoph-
ical re-examination of the corporate role in society is happening in that
277613, at *36 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991) (requiring directors of nearly insolvent corporations
to consider "community of interest" in making business decisions on corporation's behalf).
Under the view that directors owe their fiduciary duties to the entire corporate enterprise, it
makes sense to say that a shareholder must bring suit against directors "on behalf of the
corporation" or as if she were "standing in the shoes of the corporation." See infra note 101
(arguing that if class of shareholders is direct beneficiary of directorial duties, right of class
to sue directors for breaching fiduciary duties should not be characterized as derived from
corporation as a whole). Thus, under the idea of a corporate enterprise, the shareholder's
derivative suit is less of a misnomer than it is under the traditional model. Id.
85. See infra notes 86-108 and accompanying text (describing nonshareholder corporate
constituency statutes and Delaware decisions that endorse corporate enterprise idea).
86. See Mitchell, supra note 1, at 610 (calling nonshareholder constituency statutes "the
most obvious feature of the reordering of the corporate legal landscape"); Stone, supra note
4, at 47 (explaining that statutes represent departure from conventional law wisdom that
directors' sole duty is to shareholders); supra note 9 (listing 28 nonshareholder corporate
constituency statutes); see also McDaniel, supra note 6, at 151-52 (noting that several state
legislatures enacted nonshareholder constituency statutes specifically in reaction to Delaware
Supreme Court's announcement of absolute shareholder primacy in Revlon).
87. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §33-313(e) (West Supp. 1991) (requiring directors to
consider interests of nonshareholder constituencies including "community and societal consid-
erations"); see also Hanks, supra note 9, at 103-04 (discussing Connecticut's statute).
88. Stone, supra note 4, at 45. Groups whose interests directors' actions affect are also
commonly known as "stakeholders." Minnow, supra note 4, at 218.
89. Because of adherence to the view that Delaware law is "our national corporate law,"
examination of the trend in Delaware corporations law is necessary. Branson, supra note 25,
at 87.
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state as Well.9 Notwithstanding the holdings in Revlon and Katz, in* a string
of recent cases, Delaware courts have displayed a growing acceptance of
the notion that the corporation is a "corporate enterprise" encompassing
the interests of several groups, shareholders and nonshareholders alike.9'
Rehabilitating the corporate enterprise idea that Professor E. Merrick Dodd
of Harvard Law School announced more than sixty years ago in his famous
debate with Professor Adolph A. Berle of Columbia Law School,9 Dela-
ware's courts have made incremental advances towards effectively confront-
ing the tension that certain situations create among corporate constituencies.
9 3
The landmark case of Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.
9 4
was the Delaware courts' first major move toward reviving Professor Dodd's
corporate enterprise model.9s Undercutting the validity of the absolute
90. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1152 (Del.
1989) (holding that aside from short-term shareholder gain, long-term preservation of "Time
culture" is corporate interest board may consider when evaluating takeover threat); Unocal
Corp.. v. Mesa Corp., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (suggesting that in board decision whether
to defend against takeover attempt, interests of entire corporate enterprise, not just share-
holders, are at stake); Credit Lyonnais v. Pathe Communications Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150,
1991 WL 277613, at *34 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991) (indicating that directors should consider
"entire corporate enterprise" in decisionmaking process); see also Johnson, Meaning of
Corporate Life, supra note 1, at 933-36 (1990) (indicating that Delaware judiciary is grappling
with fundamental questions of corporate nature and purpose); McDaniel, supra note 6, at 152
n.110 (commenting that courts of Delaware are beginning to recognize that corporate boards
should be able to consider nonshareholder constituencies in variety of circumstances).
91. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1152 (Del.
1989) (holding that aside from short-term shareholder gain, long-term preservation of "Time
culture" is corporate interest board may consider when evaluating takeover threat); Unocal
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (holding that in context of
takeover, in order for director action to fall within protection of business judgment rule,
directors must analyze nature of takeover bid and its effect on corporate enterprise, including
impact on nonshareholder constituencies); Credit Lyonnais, 1991 WL 277613, at *36 n.55
(indicating that directors should consider "entire corporate enterprise" in decisionmaking
process); Johnson, Sovereignty, supra note 1, at 2245 n.148 (arguing that term "enterprise"
should be more prominent in corporate law because it "carries an original meaning of energy
and activity in an undertaking, and a more recent connotation of associative endeavor").
92. See Berle, supra note 35, at 1367-68 (arguing that practically speaking, law cannot
abandon emphasis on shareholder profit as corporate purpose); E. Merrick Dodd, For Whom
Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARv. L. REv. 1145, 1145-46, 1153-54 (1932) (putting
forth corporate enterprise concept; arguing that corporations have responsibilities to their
communities); see also Hanks, supra note 9, at 97-98 (tracing corporate enterprise theory
forward from Berle-Dodd debate to present).
93. See Time, 571 A.2d at 1152 (holding that aside from short-term shareholder gain,
long-term preservation of "Time culture" is corporate interest board may consider when
evaluating takeover threat); Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 (suggesting that in board decision whether
to defend against takeover attempt, interests of entire corporate enterprise, not just share-
holders, are at stake); Credit Lyonnais, 1991 WL 277613, at *34 (indicating that directors
should consider entire corporate enterprise in decisionmaking process).
94. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
95. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989); see
supra note 92 and accompanying text (attributing corporate enterprise idea to Professor Dodd).
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shareholder primacy principle of Revlon, 96 the Delaware Supreme Court in
Time viewed the corporation as an entity distinct from the shareholders.Y
.The latest development, footnote fifty-five of Credit Lyonnais, builds
on Time's premise and is potentially much more powerful.18 In what one
distinguished member of the Delaware Bar called the "footnote of the
year," Chancellor Allen made the big leap from stating that sometimes
directors may consider other stakeholders' interests to asserting that the
board should consider other stakeholders' interests in certain situations."
Reopening several seemingly settled questions of Delaware's corporations
law,1°° Chancellor Allen indicated that when a not-yet-insolvent corporation
is operating "in the vicinity of insolvency," the board of directors owes
fiduciary duties not to the shareholders exclusively, but to the entire cor-
porate enterprise. 0
96. See Lyman Johnson & David Millon, The Case Beyond Time, 45 Bus. LAW. 2105,
2110-12, 2117-20 (1990) (describing how Time decision narrowed Revlon's applicability by
treating it as special case); Wallman, supra note 6, at 166 n.10 (pointing out that because of
Time, Revlon has "limited vitality").
97. See Johnson & Millon, supra note 96, at 2108-09 (noting that Time court recognized
that director action in best interests of corporation can be contrary to shareholders' profit-
maximizing interests).
98. Credit Lyonnais v. Pathe Communications Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150, 1991 WL
277613, at *34 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
99. See id. at *36 (indicating what directors in footnote's hypothetical should do;
indicating which course of action would be "right"-i.e., both efficient and fair); see also
Footnote of the Year, supra note 25, at 388 (quoting A. Gilchrist Sparks III of Morris,
Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell in Wilmington, Delaware, who called Credit Lyonnais's footnote 55
"footnote of the year"); cf. Time 571 A.2d at 1152 (holding that board may take corporate
interests other than those of shareholders into account in making business decision); Unocal
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (holding that directors may
consider impact of decision on nonshareholder constituencies).
100. See Mills Acquisition Co. v. McMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del. 1989)
(holding that directors owe fiduciary duties to corporation and its shareholders); Revlon v.
McAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (same); Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985) (same); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del.
1939) (same); Katz v. Oak Indus., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986) (making clear that
creditors are not beneficiaries of directors' fiduciary duties); supra notes 63-67 and accompa-
nying text (indicating that traditional model allows only shareholders to bring derivative suits
on corporation's behalf).
101. Credit Lyonnais, 1991 WL 277613, at *36 n.55; see also Varallo & Finkelstein, supra
note 17, at 241 (recounting that in footnote 55, Chancellor Allen created directorial fiduciary
"duties" to nonshareholder members of corporate enterprise on verge of insolvency).
A. Gilchrist Sparks III considers Chancellor Allen's reasoning in footnote 55 a clever
way of sidestepping the case law because the Chancellor starts with the principle that directors
owe duties not only to the shareholders but to the corporation itself. Footnote of the Year,
supra note 25, at 388. Given that starting point, the Chancellor's holding-that directors may
not take actions which when viewed from a risk-adjusted basis, would harm the corporation
even if the action would be desirable from the standpoint of the shareholders-seems natural.
Id.
But the Chancellor's holding that the board's fiduciary duties run to the corporation as
a whole is not without support. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 307 (1939) (holding that
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In footnote fifty-five, Chancellor Allen provided a hypothetical situation
to demonstrate the various corporate constituencies' legitimate and compet-
ing interests that inevitably become increasingly prevalent as a corporation
nears insolvency. 10 2 Next, he pointed out that the director of an almost
insolvent corporation who concerns himself only with the interests of the
shareholders will not always reach the "right" result. 103 It is instead the
director who considers the interests of the range of constituencies that
together comprise the "corporation as a legal and economic entity" that
will accomplish the desirable end of fair and efficient corporate gover-
nance.'04 The footnote reads, in part:
[11n managing the corporate affairs of a solvent corporation in the
vicinity of insolvency, circumstances may arise when the right (both
the efficient and the fair) course to follow for the corporation may
diverge from the choice that the stockholders (or the creditors, or
the employees, or any single group interested in the corporation)
would make if given the opportunity to act.105
When contrasted with the language and sentiment of Revlon'0
6 and Katz,"°7
both of which are typical of the traditional approach to the duties of
directors are fiduciaries only of corporation itself); Schautteet v. Chester State Bank, 707 F.
Supp. 885, 888-89 (E.D. Tex. 1988) (holding that fiduciary obligations protect entire community
of interests in corporation); Enterra Corp. v. SGS Assocs., 600 F. Supp. 678, 684 (D.C. Pa.
1985) (holding that directors stand in fiduciary relation to corporation); Underwood v. Stafford,
155 S.E.2d 211, 212 (N.C. 1967) (holding that in North Carolina, boards occupy fiduciary
position with regard to shareholders and creditors) ; Goodwin v. Whitener, 138 S.E.2d 232
(N.C. 1964) (holding that fiduciary duties are owed to corporation); see also John C. Carter,
The Rights of Other Corporate Constituencies, 22 MEM. ST. U. L. REv. 491, 493-94 (1992)
(arguing that case law holding that directors owe direct duties to shareholders is "virtually
nonexistent"); Wyatt R. Haskell, The Relationship of Directors of a Close Corporation to Its
Creditors, I Cuim. L. REV. 209, 209 (1970) (recounting "accepted legal theory" that directors
owe direct duties to corporation itself and only derivative ones to shareholders); Mitchell,
supra note 1, at 580-81 (characterizing idea that shareholders are exclusive beneficiaries of
directors' fiduciary duties as notion that needs to be put to rest); Wallman, supra note 6, at
166 n.1l (relating that under early corporation jurisprudence, directors' sole duty was to
corporation).
Moreover, the fact that shareholders as a class cannot, in their own right, sue the directors
when the directors breach the fiduciary duties implies that the directors do not owe their
fiduciary duties to the shareholders. See Niles v. New York Cent. & H. R.R., 68 N.E. 142,
144 (Del. 1903) (holding that absent direct fraudulent transaction between director and
shareholder, shareholder can maintain suit against director only derivatively, based on injury
to corporation). In other words, if the directors owe fiduciary duties to the shareholders as a
collective unit, why must the shareholders bring suits "on behalf of the corporation"? Id.




106. See Revlon v. McAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 176 (Del. 1986)
(holding that director action based on concern for nonshareholders is only appropriate when
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directors and the rights of creditors of solvent corporations, footnote fifty-
five does indeed appear to signal a significant departure.'0 s
IV. ASSESSMENT OF THE JuICLu AND LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS
A. Comparison of the Substantive Features and Flaws of the Reform
Efforts
To date, neither judicial nor legislative efforts adequately address the
problem of the lack of director attention to the interests of nonshareholder
constituencies in the corporate decisionmaking process.1°9 Relatively speak-
ing, however, the judicial trend in Delaware is more promising as a start
down an avenue of real change.110
Ironically, by all but eliminating directorial accountability, the well-
intended nonshareholder corporate constituency statutes worsen the situation
facing all members of the corporate body."' Carefully cast in permissive
that action will yield some rationally related benefit to stockholders); supra notes 44-47 and
accompanying text (discussing Revlon holding).
107. See Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986) (stating that "[iut
is the obligation of the directors to attempt, within the law, to maximize the long-run interests
of the corporation's stockholders ... It seems likely that corporate restructurings designed to
maximize shareholder values may in some instances have the effect of requiring [creditors] to
bear greater risk of loss and thus in effect transfer economic value from bondholders to
stockholders"); supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text (discussing Katz).
108. See Footnote of the Year, supra note 25, at 388 (reporting that footnote 55 "appears
to signal a deviation from well-settled Delaware principles"); Winnike, supra note 27 (noting
that in Katz and Revlon, Delaware courts had forcefully rejected assertions that Credit
Lyonnais's footnote 55 accepts). But see Varallo & Finkelstein, supra note 17, at 242 n.12
(indicating that Katz and Credit Lyonnais are not necessarily inconsistent).
109. See infra notes 111-18 and accompanying text (detailing theoretical weaknesses of
nonshareholder corporate constituency statutes); infra note 120 and accompanying text (de-
scribing limited scope of pre-Credit Lyonnais Delaware common law's progress on creating
incentives for directors to address nonshareholder needs); infra notes 143-63 and accompanying
text (arguing that statutes and Delaware common-law advances-including Credit Lyonnais-
are ineffective because they lack nonshareholder enforcement 'mechanisms). But see Stone,
supra note 4, at 71 (stating that enactment of nonshareholder corporate constituency statutes
is important, even for its value as signal that nonshareholder interests deserve serious public
attention).
110. See infra notes 119-42 and accompanying text (pointing out differences between
Credit Lyonnais and statutes). One scholar maintains that in enacting the statutes, state
legislatures expected that courts would use the common law to supplement them and make
them more effective. See McDaniel, supra note 6, at 126 & n.19 (arguing that nonshareholder
corporate constituency statutes require judicial interpretation and development and that
"[cl]orporate constituency statutes are not necessary for the development of a corporate common
law that enables directors to consider and protect stakeholder interests").
111. See William J. Carney, Does Defining Constituencies Matter?, 59 U. CIN. L. REv.
385, 418 (1990) (maintaining that nonshareholder constituency statutes hinder corporate law's
goal of making directors accountable); Macey, supra note 12, at 32-33 (arguing that because
statutes are typically permissive and without exception unenforceable, they render directors
free of accountability for their actions). But see Wallman, supra note 6, at 188 (arguing that
nonshareholder constituency statutes "do not purport to provide nonshareholder constituents
with 'enhanced legal protections,' but instead require the directors to focus on and act in the
best interests of the corporation").
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language, the vast majority of these statutes" 2 leave the board free to
consider or not to consider the interests of any or all of the corporate
constituencies."' The statutes grant the board "standardless discretion"
114
because virtually any action the board might take, it could justify after-the-
fact as having served the interests of some member of the corporate
enterprise."15
Moreover, even assuming that corporate directors would not see these
statutes as invitations to serve their own interests, the statutes provide the
board with virtually no guidance in determining when and how to give
adequate attention to each of the corporate interests the statutes recognize
as legitimate." 6 For that reason, one commentator asserts that nonshare-
holder corporate constituency statutes create "too many masters" for the
corporate board to sere. ' 7 As Professor Lawrence Mitchell similarly ex-
112. But see CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-313(e) (West Supp. 1991) (requiring directors
to consider interests of nonshareholder constituencies including "community and societal
considerations").
113. But see McDaniel, supra note 6, at 126 (arguing that by being imprecise, nonshare-
holder corporate constituency statutes direct courts to develop standards and supply particulars);
Wallman, supra note 6, at 165-66 (contending that directors must justify their actions as being
in corporation's best interests, not those of any single constituency).
114. James J. Hanks, Jr., Non-Stockholder Constituency Statutes: An Idea Whose Time
Should Never Have Come, INStIHTS, Dec. 1989, at 20, 24-25. But see McDaniel, supra note
6, at 160 (arguing that courts will create standards through evolution of corporate common
law).
115. See Macey, supra note 12, at 32-33 (contending that nonshareholder corporate
constituency statutes make directors' jobs easier because "virtually any management decision,
no matter how arbitrary, can be rationalized on the grounds that it benefits some constituency
of the corporation); see also F.A. Hayek, Law, Legislation, Liberty, in 3 THE POLITICAL
OaER OF A FREE PEOPLE 82 (1979) (expressing concern that without narrowly circumscribed
class of beneficiaries of directors' fiduciary duties, corporate directors would be too powerful).
But see McDaniel, supra note 6, at 137-39 (arguing that creation of dual goal for directors-
increasing shareholder gain and decreasing stakeholder loss-would not do away with account-
ability because "[n]either variable is vague; both can be quantified and monitored"); Wallman,
supra note 6, at 165-66 (contending that because nonshareholder constituency statutes require
director action "in the best interests of the corporation," they do not reduce board account-
ability; directors must act in interest of entire corporation and cannot justify their actions as
benefitting only one group) (emphasis added).
116. See Hanks, supra note 9, at 113-15 (arguing that nonshareholder corporate constit-
uency statutes lack standards foi directors to use in protecting shareholder and nonshareholder
interests); see also Brudney, supra note 54, at 1837 n.49 (arguing that because of conflicts of
interest between stockholders and bondholders, management cannot occupy fiduciary relation-
ship to both).
117. Macey, supra note 12, at 31. Though he agrees with the "too many masters"
argument, Professor Macey thinks that some scholars overstate it. Id. at 33. If the problem
of directors having too many masters is so intractable, then why, Professor Macey asks, are
corporate directors able to discharge their fiduciary duties to shareholders with varying classes
of stock even though the different classmembers' interests sometimes conflict. Id.; see also
McDaniel, Stockholders and Stakeholders, supra note 6, at 158 (arguing that neither law nor
fact supports proposition that directors can be agents -of only one constituency; rejecting
argument that "manager responsible to two conflicting interests is in fact accountable to
neither") (quoting Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L. Rav. 1161, 1192 (1981).
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plained, the statutes raise "the spectre ... of a board of directors blindly
groping to balance the conflicting interests of a variety of constituent groups
without any means of measuring the interests required to be considered or
of assessing the relative priorities of such interests." ' l
Compared to the nonshareholder corporate constituency statutes, the
doctrinal development taking place in Delaware's common law is more
encouraging, especially the latest breakthrough that footnote fifty-five of
Credit Lyonnais represents." 9 Whereas Time and other recent Delaware
opinions, like the nonshareholder corporate constituency statutes, merely
broadened the scope of directorial discretion, 20 Credit Lyonnais's footnote
fifty-five did more.' 2' With footnote fifty-five, Chancellor Allen seems to
have created duties for directors, rather than just the option to consider
the interests of nonshareholders. 22
Recognizing that the exigencies of running a corporation do not remain
stagnant over the span of corporate life, footnote fifty-five takes an elastic
approach to the question of directorial fiduciary duties.'2 Unlike the tra-
ditional model, footnote fifty-five does not adopt the stance that share-
holders are the exclusive beneficiaries of the board's fiduciary. duties.'2' Nor
did Chancellor Allen appear in footnote fifty-five to espouse the nonshare-
holder constituency statutes' view that a board may simply choose to concern
itself with the needs of any or all of the corporate constituencies in making
a decision. 25 Instead, footnote fifty-five requires directors to be sensitive to
the corporation's factual circumstances which can cause the interests of one
118. Mitchell, supra note 1, at 589.
119. See infra notes 120-27 and accompanying text (describing theoretically effective,
intermediate approach Credit Lyonnais's footnote 55 takes between traditional model and
nonshareholder corporate constituency statutes).
120. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.; 571 A.2d 1140, 1152 (Del.
1989) (indicating that board may consider corporate interests other than shareholders' in
making business decision on corporation's behalf); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Corp., 493 A.2d
946, 955 (Del. 1985) (holding that board may consider nonshareholder constituencies' interests
in certain contexts); see also Johnson & Millon, supra note 96, at 2108 (describing "troubling"
accountability problem Time decision creates and noting that Time provides directors no
guidance for acting in corporation's best interests); Wallman, supra note 6, at 172 (observing
that Time's approach is similar to that of nonshareholder corporate constituency statutes).
121. See Credit Lyonnais v. Pathe Communications Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150, 1991 WL
277613, at *36 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991) (indicating what.directors in footnote's hypothetical
should do; indicating which course of action would be "right"-i.e., both efficient and fair).
122. Id.; see Varallo & Finkelstein, supra note 17, at 241-43 (detailing duties Chancellor
Allen created in footnote 55).
123. See Credit Lyonnais, 1991 WL 277613, at *36 n.55 (indicating that corporate
circumstances are quite relevant in determination of whose interests board decisions must seek
to shield).
124. See supra notes 40-47 (describing traditional model's shareholder-centered approach
to defining directorial fiduciary duties).
125. See supra notes 111-15 and infra notes 149-56 and accompanying text (describing
how permissive and unenforceable attributes of nonshareholder corporate constituency statutes
free directors of accountability for decisionmaking).
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or more constituencies to be unusually vulnerable in a given context. 12 6 By
directing the board to act upon such corporate particulars in the discharge
of its fiduciary duties to the corporation, the footnote takes an effective,
intermediate position between the two extremes of the traditional model
and the nonshareholder corporate constituency statutes. 2 7 Chancellor Allen
did not, however, delineate the scope of applicability he intended footnote
fifty-five's more flexible approach to have.' 8 While it is apparent that the
footnote's reasoning works to the benefit of creditors of corporations
nearing insolvency, 2 9 it is less obvious whether the Chancellor meant to
invite any extensions of the reasoning such that other stakeholders may
sometimes take advantage of the ideas in the footnote as well.130
If nothing else, footnote fifty-five makes the important contribution of
improving upon the ideas underlying the traditional model's insolvency
exception.' Recognizing the unique circumstances of corporations on the
verge of insolvency, Chancellor Allen,in footnote fifty-five, called for dif-
ferential treatment of such corporations from other solvent corporations.
3 2
He demonstrated that Geyer's test of insolvency-in-fact'33 is inadequate as
126. Credit Lyonnais v. Pathe Communications Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150, 1991 WL
277613, at *34 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991) (identifying board duties by first assessing corporate
circumstances: "At least where a corporation is operating in the vicinity of insolvency, a board
of directors is not merely the agent of the residue risk bearers, but owes its duty to the
corporate enterprise") (emphasis added); see also McDaniel, supra note 6, at 146-47 (main-
taining that while stakeholder statutes presently confer no legally enforceable rights, perhaps
courts will later "recognize that directors owe enforceable duties to some stakeholders in some
cases, particularly primary stakeholders when they are being expropriated") (emphasis added).
See generally Mitchell, supra note 1, at 590 (arguing in favor of situation-specific directorial
fiduciary duties).
127. See supra note 18 (quoting footnote 55 of Credit Lyonnais). -
128. See supra note 18 (quoting footnote 55 of Credit Lyonnais).
129. See Winnike, supra note 27 (stating that Credit Lyonnais's footnote 55 expands range
of situations in which directors are fiduciaries of creditors).
130. See supra note 18 (quoting footnote 55 of Credit Lyonnais).
131. See Winnike, supra note 27 (pointing out that Credit Lyonnais "may be read as
expanding the range of situations in which a financially troubled company's directors become
fiduciaries for its creditors"); supra notes 54-62 and accompanying text (describing traditional
model's insolvency exception to general rule that board owes no extra-contractual duties to
corporate creditors). But see New York Credit Men's Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Weiss, 110
N.E.2d 397, 398 (N.Y. 1953) (holding that though corporation was technically solvent, because
insolvency was "only a few days away," directors were creditors' trustees); Brudney, supra
note 54, at 1843 n.68 (citing Credit Lyonnais's footnote 55 as support for proposition that
insolvency exception is problematic in practice); Varallo & Finkelstein, supra note 17, at 243
(asserting that even without Credit Lyonnais's footnote 55, something short of insolvency
might cause trust for benefit of creditors to arise).
132. The debate footnote 55 of Credit Lyonnais has engendered centers on those corpo-
rations which, though technically solvent, are operating on shaky grounds. Footnote of the
Year, supra note 25, at 388.
133. See Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications, Civ. A. No. 12406, 1992 WL 136743 (Del. Ch.
June 18, 1992) (holding that insolvency exception to general rule that board owes no fiduciary
duties to corporate creditors attaches at moment of insolvency-in-fact rather than at institution
of statutory proceedings).
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the temporal indicator of the need for a shift in the fiduciary duties of
corporate directors from the shareholders to the creditors.'3 4 Because avoid-
ance of insolvency is usually a goal of creditors, the moment that a
corporation becomes insolvent-in-fact is too late for the directors' duties to
creditors to arise.'3 5 In other words, according to Chancellor Allen, the
turning point from solvency to insolvency comes too late to be the relevant
event signalling the requirement of a shift in corporate directors' attention. 36
Illuminating the unique predicament of creditors of an almost insolvent
corporation may not have been the only goal of Credit Lyonnais's footnote
fifty-five. Perhaps Chancellor Allen used the near-insolvency scenario as an
example to make the broader point that the identity of the beneficiaries of
directorial duties should vary in connection with the subject of the decision
facing the board.'3 7 The Chancellor clearly did put forth the important
assertion that directors should consider the corporate community of interests
when acting on behalf of the corporation.' Moreover, Chancellor Allen
emphasized that the corporation's condition should dictate how the board
will translate its consideration of the various corporate constituencies into
action. '39
Through the hypothetical situation of almost-insolvency that Chancellor
Allen posited in footnote fifty-five, he provided an example of a time in
the corporate life when the interests of the corporate creditors deserve
special attention. 14 In calling for a shift in the board's fiduciary duties
when the corporation is financially troubled, the Chancellor opened the
door to the argument that there are other situations in which the board's
fiduciary duties should shift and accrue to the benefit of other specific
nonshareholder groups.' 4' Thus, one can use footnote fifty-five to contend
that the issue of which particular stakeholders' interests are of primary
concern-and therefore which interests the board should take extra pains
to shield-will depend on the circumstances.'
42
134. Credit Lyonnais v. Pathe Communications Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150, 1991 WL
277613, at *36 n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
135. See id. (requiring directors to consider creditors' interests when corporation is
technically solvent, but "in the vicinity of insolvency").
136. Id.; see also supra notes 63-70 and accompanying text (discussing insolvency exception
to general rule that board owes no fiduciary duties to corporate creditors).
137. See generally Mitchell, supra note 1, at 590 (arguing in favor of creation of
circumstance-specific fiduciary duties on part of corporate boards).
138. See Credit Lyonnais, 1991 WL 277613, at *36 n.55 (stating that directors should
consider "community of interests" in making decisions for corporation).
139. See id. (indicating that consideration of community of interests dictates what action
board should take). The duty of care, as it is typically formulated, contains an indication that
what is required of directors should vary with the circumstances. See REVISED MODE. Bus.
CoRPs. ACT § 8.30(a)(2) (requiring director to exercise care that ordinary prudent person in
like position would exercise under similar circumstances).
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B. Procedural Problems: Rights Without Remedies?
Both the nonshareholder constituency statutes and the common-law
developments in Delaware represent important theoretical challenges to the
traditional model of corporate governance, but neither addresses the tradi-
tional model's rule limiting to the corporate shareholders the ability to sue
the board on behalf of the corporation. 43 Indeed, recognition of the need
for an enforcement mechanism for the theoretical change is imusually sparse
in the contemporary attack on the traditional model.' 44
To the extent that the interests of the nonshareholder constituencies
coincide with the interests of the shareholders, the traditional scheme is
effective in protecting the entire corporation. 45 When a board violates its
fiduciary duties, injuring a nonshareholder group, as long as the directors'
action also injures the shareholders, the wrong can be redressed, because
the shareholders can sue on behalf of the corporation.'14 If, however, the
directors' action actually benefits the shareholders at the expense of the
nonshareholder group, 47 the nonshareholders have no recourse under tra-
ditional corporate theory.'"
143. See Credit Lyonnais v. Pathe Communications Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150, 1991 WL
277613, at *36 n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991) (failing to address enforcement question); infra
notes 149-50 and accompanying text (discussing statutes' refusal to grant means of enforcement
to nonshareholders); see also Footnote of the Year, supra note 25, at 388-89 (noting absence
of discussion of enforcement mechanism in footnote 55).
144. But see Hanks, supra note 9, at 116-17 (noting confusion nonshareholder constituency
statutes produce on standing question); Stone, supra note 4, at 71 (advocating that courts
develop a stakeholders' derivative action).
145. See Macey, supra note 12, at 34-35 (pointing out that over broad range of issues,
shareholders' interests and nonshareholders' interests do not conflict). Professor Mitchell uses
the term ','vertical conflict" to refer to situations where conflict exists between the interests of
the powerful director and the interests of one or more of the considerably less powerful
corporate constituencies. Mitchell, supra note 1, at 591.
The classic example of an interest all corporate constituencies share is the prevention of
directorial self-dealing. Id. When in the interest of seeking to avoid directorial self-dealing,
the law imposes fiduciary duties on directors, the law is providing that when in the decision-
making process, a director is faced with a vertical conflict of interest, he cannot make the
choice that advances his own interests at the expense of the corporate constituencies. Id.; see
also Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306-07 (1939) (indicating that purpose of imposition of
directorial fiduciary duties is more to prevent director misconduct than to protect beneficiaries
of the duties); Kanda, supra note 52, at 441 n.30 (stating that corporate directors' fiduciary
duties are "legal apparatus to deter abuse of managerial discretion"). I
146. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text (discussing traditional law's limit on
standing to sue board derivatively for injury to corporation).
147. See, e.g., Credit Lyonnais v. Pathe Communications, Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150,
1991 WL 277613, at *36 n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991) (examining shareholders' and creditors'
differing risk incentives when corporation is on verge of insolvency); John C. Coffee, Unstable
Coalitions: Corporate Governance as a Multi-Player Game, 78 GEO. L.J. 1495, 1498 (1990)
(indicating that in takeover context, shareholder gains come at creditors' and employees'
expense); Stone, supra note 4, at 71 (arguing that while management's defending against hostile
takeover benefits shareholders, it hurts employees).
When the board acts in the interests of the shareholder, to the exclusion of the interests
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Nonshareholder corporate constituency statutes typically are silent on
the question of whether the stakeholders, whose interests the statutes seek
to advance, may sue the directors for violating the statutes' provisions.
49
In fact, Pennsylvania's legislature addressed the question of enforcement by
including in the state's statute an express denial of standing to nonshare-
holders.5 0 Because the statutes include no enforcement mechanism in favor
of their supposed protectees, they are woefully inadequate at offering even
mild protection for stakeholder interests.' This inadequacy frustrates both
the classic goal of the fiduciary duties under the traditional model-
preventing directorial self-dealing152-and the statutes' newer, but equally
important goal of preventing directors from inappropriately favoring share-
holders at the expense of other constituencies. 5 3
It is in part because of their failure to include an enforcement tool that
the nonshareholder corporate constituency statutes accomplish a grant of
greater latitude to the corporate directorate.1 4 Former Commissioner of the
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) Joseph Grundfest recognized this
of other constituencies, it chooses among the conflicting interests which exist among subordinate
groups rather than between the board and one or more subordinate group(s). Mitchell, supra
note 1, at 592. Professor Mitchell has termed a conflict of interests among constituent groups
a "horizontal conflict". Id. at 591. As the traditional law stands, directors are to favor the
shareholder in all such situations. Id. at 594.
148. See infra notes 63-67 and accompanying text (setting out traditional model's rule
granting only shareholders standing to sue directors on corporation's behalf).
149. See Hanks, supra note 9, at 117 (noting that most nonshareholder corporate con-
stituency statutes do not address question of enforcement).
150. See 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1717 (1991). Section 1717 states:
The duty of the board of directors ... may be enforced directly by the corporation
or may be enforced by a shareholder, as such, by an action in the right of the
corporation, and may not be enforced directly by a shareholder or by any other
person or group. Notwithstanding the previous sentence, sections 1715(a) and (b)
(relating to the exercise of powers generally) and section 1716(a) (relating to alter-
native standard) do not impose upon the board of directors, committees of the
board and individual directors any legal or equitable duties, obligation or liabilities
or create any right or cause of action against, or basis for standing to sue, the board
of directors, committees of the board and individual directors.
Id.
151. But see Wallman, supra note 6, at 188-89 (pointing out that nonshareholder constit-
uency statutes do not aim to create legal structure under which directors owe fiduciary duties
to constituencies themselves, but rather to entire corporation; arguing that because statutes do
not intend to give constituencies "direct voice in corporate governance," enforceability is
unnecessary).
152. See Pepper v. Litton, .308 U.S. 295, 306-07 (1939) (holding that prevention of
directorial self-dealing is reason for making directors fiduciaries); see also Mitchell, supra note
1, at 591 (explaining that vertical conflicts are the reason for the imposition of fiduciary duties
on corporate directors); supra note 145 (explaining what Professor Mitchell means by "vertical
conflict").
153. See supra note 147 (discussing horizontal conflicts).
154. See Mitchell, supra note 1, at 580 (citing concerns of Commissioner of Securities
Exchange Commission and ABA Business Law Section that constituency statutes grant authority
without accountability and create potential for directorial mischief).
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fundamental flaw in the view that permissive nonshareholder corporate
constituency statutes advance or protect the interests of the other corporate
stakeholders.'55 In a 1989 letter to New York Governor, Mario Cuomo, he
remarked that such statutes leave the nonshareholder corporate constituen-
cies "powerless to monitor or challenge the actions that are purportedly
taken in their interest.'
5 6
Similarly, by not providing for nonshareholder enforcement of the duties
it recognizes, Credit Lyonnais's footnote fifty-five limits its own impact as
an advance in the corporate law. 5 7 Whether Chancellor Allen's design in
writing footnote fifty-five was to affect only creditors of almost-insolvent
corporations or to benefit other corporate constituencies in other circum-
stances, the absence of an enforcement mechanism in the footnote under-
mines the power of the innovative ideas it contains. Without teeth, the
duties Chancellor Allen recognized in footnote fifty-five-however broad or
narrow he intended them to be-will have no effect on the actual dynamics
of the modern corporation. 158
To corporate creditors footnote fifty-five certainly does represent a
theoretical victory over the traditional law's rule that denies creditors
beneficiary status with regard to directors' fiduciary duties. 5 9 Nonetheless,
because the footnote excludes mention of what, if any, enforcement mech-
anism will be at the creditors' disposal while the corporation lingers "in
the vicinity of insolvency," it offers only artificial protection for the
creditors' interests.'60 Moreover, unless accompanied by the threat of liti-
gation, application of the logic of footnote fifty-five to proclaim the
importance of other stakeholders' interests in other situations will be an
impotent means of affecting director behavior.' 6' As Professor Mitchell
argues, one of the main motivations of corporate directors is the avoidance
of liability. 16 2 If in the theoretical world, directors' duties shift as the
corporate circumstances change, but in the real world, only the shareholders
155. See id. (quoting from letter from Joseph Grundfest, Securities and Exchange Com-
missioner to Mario Cuomo, governor of New York on June 6, 1989).
156. Id.
157. See Credit Lyonnais v. Pathe Communications Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150, 1991 WL
277613, at *36 n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
158. See Mitchell, supra note 1, at 606-07 (arguing that in practical sense standing comes
first, duty second); supra note 64 (explaining Professor Mitchell's argument).
159. See supra notes 131-36 and accompanying text (illustrating how Chancellor Allen,
through footnote 55, improved upon traditional model's insolvency exception to general rule
that board owes no extra-contractual duties to creditors).
160. See Footnote of the Yeqr, supra note 25 at 388-89 (speculating about what sort of
creditors' action, if any, footnote 55 implicates). According to A. Gilchrist Sparks III, an
action based on footnote 55 would be a derivative action. Id. He suggested that one could
use footnote 55's 'corporate enterprise' concept to argue for allowing nonshareholder constit-
uencies to bring something akin to a derivative suit. Id.
161. See supra note 101 (outlining Professor Mitchell's theory that directors will protect
interests of those who can sue them if they do not).
162. See supra note 101 (outlining Professor Mitchell's theory that directors will protect
interests of those who can sue them if they do not).
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can sue the directors for breach, the footnote's new recognition of non-
shareholder interests will not fulfill its promise of change in board incen-
tives. 63
V. CONCLUSION
The tendency of the traditional model of corporate governance to equate
the corporation with its shareholders is under fire. By considering share-
holders the exclusive beneficiaries of the board's fiduciary duties and by
allowing only shareholders to sue on the corporation's behalf to enforce
these duties, the traditional rules force directors, in the interest of avoiding
liability, not to respond to the interests of other stakeholders, particularly
when they conflict with those of the shareholders. Because of criticism of
the traditional model, Professor Dodd's view of the corporation as an
enterprise comprised of a number of varying constituencies has resurfaced.
Twenty-eight states' well-meaning legislative attempts at reform have
thus far been flawed. In trying to make directors' decisions reflect concern
for the various constituencies that make up the corporate enterprise, non-
shareholder corporate constituency statutes actually free up directors' hands,
rendering director accountability even more of a fiction than it is under the
traditional model. This is true in part because the statutes do not make
nonshareholder enforcement a part of their corporate enterprise scheme.
Because it is more theoretically sound, the theory evolving in the courts
of Delaware has a brighter future as a basis for putting the corporate
enterprise idea into action. Whether or not Chancellor Allen intended the
effect, Credit Lyonnais's footnote fifty-five offers the foundation for using
situation-specific fiduciary duties to solve the problems with the traditional
model's shareholders-only view. With the understanding that in general, the
board's fiduciary duties run to all corporate stakeholders, courts could,
over time, identify a narrow class of situation-specific directorial duties
running to specific stakeholder groups depending on the predicament the
corporation faces.
The suggestion that the law recognize situation-specific directorial fi-
duciary duties is not so drastic a proposal. The law already recognizes such
duties in a small class of exceptions to the general rule that the board
stands in a fiduciary relationship to the shareholders alone. The traditional
model already recognizes that under "special circumstances" -fraud, insol-
vency, or a director's violation of statute-the directors' fiduciary duties
should run to stakeholders other than the shareholders.' 64 Indeed, when
circumstances change, activating one of the traditional exceptions and
163. See supra note 101 (outlining Professor Mitchell's theory that directors will protect
interests of those who can sue them if they do not).
164. See supra note 55 and accompanying text (listing "special circumstances" that
traditional model recognizes as warranting departure from general rule that boards owe no
extra-contractual duties to nonshareholders).
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shifting the fiduciary duties, courts assess the legality of directors' acts using
very different principles than they do before the shift.
65
In a sense, then, Credit Lyonnais's footnote fifty-five merely challenges
the adequacy of the list of existing exceptions. Thus, though footnote fifty-
five is part of the philosophical revolution happening in the corporate law,
to the extent that it causes changes in fiduciary duties of directors based
on circumstances, it represents only an extension of well-rooted, existing
principles of law.'16
Admittedly, optimism that Delaware courts will adopt a rule of situation-
specific duties based on Credit Lyonnais's footnote fifty-five could be
premature. Even so, footnote fifty-five, has generated its share of hope,
attention, and concern among members of the Delaware Bar. 67 In it,
Chancellor Allen points the way to a more nuanced analysis, an approach
that rejects both the traditional model's extreme position-that board fi-
duciary duties run just to shareholders-and the statutes' opposite extreme-
that the board may consider all corporate constituencies but is, in effect,
accountable to nobody.
Tainting the flurry of excitement caused by Credit Lyonnais's footnote
fifty-five is its omission of an answer to the question of enforcement. If
the Delaware courts plan to implement the legal world's changing outlook
on the corporation, they must also effect a corresponding change in cor-
porate directors' incentives in the real world. Incentives for directors to act
consistently with the corporate enterprise idea should take the form of
potential liability. Without an enforcement mechanism, even if the ree-
mergence of corporate enterprise theory causes the modern corporation to
undergo a massive and complete theoretical facelift, the corporation will,
as a practical matter, retain the one-track mind of a profit-seeking share-
holder. Thus, if the law continues to deny nonshareholder constituencies an
enforcement mechanism, the corporate enterprise notion will remain a
toothless ideal.
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165. Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications Co., C.V. No. 12406, 1992 WL 136743, at *2 (Del.
Ch. June 18, 1992).
166. Winnike, supra note 27 (stating that footnote 55 expands range of situations in
which directors are fiduciaries of creditors to include near insolvency).
167. See Footnote of the Year, supra note 25, at 388 (reporting. that footnote 55 has
caused stir in Delaware); Winnike, supra note 27 (describing Credit Lyonnais as "potential
catalyst" for important changes in Delaware law); see also Stephanie J. Seligman, Just-in-
Case: Planning for a Potential Restructuring, 793 PRACTISiNG LEGAL INST. CORP. L. AND
PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 703 (1992) (describing impact of Credit Lyonnais's footnote
55).
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